Abstract
Terrorism
has in recent times emerged as a major challenge to Bangladesh. The discourse
on terrorism has changed; it is marked by new trends and the terrorist threats
are now more diverse in terms of motivation, financing, and security
implications. The government response to terrorism in Bangladesh demonstrates
the use
of ‘hard power’
without addressing the root causes and new trends. The government has been
strategically, operationally and tactically challenged by the new techniques
and technology of terrorism. In such a context, the paper aims to map out
terrorism threat in Bangladesh, considering threat indicators and levels, so
that a viable anti-terrorism strategy can be developed. Analysing the available
threat indicators and applying SWOT tools, the paper argues that the threat of
domestic terrorism has been significantly reduced since the dismantling of the
leadership pattern of the extremist groups. However, given Bangladesh’s
limited counter terrorism strengths and the
increasing access of the threat groups to many opportunities, the potential
threat indicators are still visible on the country’s horizon.
The paper emphasises on long-
term measures such as modernization of religious education system, eradication
of social disparities, strengthening of community response, utilization of
local knowledge and capacity, and identification of
‘strategic communication’ tools to interact with extremist individuals and groups in order to develop a
comprehensive strategy to face the menace of terrorism in Bangladesh.
Chapter I
Introduction
1.1 Introductory
Paragraphs
Global
anti-terrorist security spending has since 2001 been rising by between US$65
billion and US$200 billion a year. Today, seven years after the 9/11 incidents,
analysing the costs and benefits, it has been claimed that the benefits are
still lower than the costs.[1] The
recent literature demonstrates new trends and techniques of terrorism
world-wide. If someone dismantles operational tactics in one part of the world,
the other part moves with even deadlier tactics - the ideological networking.
Thus, the new counter terrorism discourse looks for new techniques and
understanding in order to reduce the impact of terrorism on society. Moreover, over time, the type, number and
lethality of terrorist attacks, the attitudes of terrorist groups, and other
factors have changed. A report on Trends
in Terrorism: 2006 by the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS)
identifies three new trends of global terrorism. First, the emergence of
micro-actors with capability of terrorist groups, i.e. reduction in the
operational capability of the terrorist groups, but increase in their
ideological, motivational, and propaganda ability. The second is the promotion
of operational sophistication of terrorist activities, using modern technology
and global information flow, finance and ideas in planning, communications, and
targeting. As a matter of fact, many analysts consider terrorism a web-directed
phenomenon.2 And the last is the increasing trend of overlapping
terrorist activities with transnational crime, using the same supply,
transport, and money moving networks.[2]
The world-wide terrorist activities, successive attacks, and propaganda
demonstrate new intentions, capabilities, and opportunities for further
attacks.
Terrorism has been a worrying factor for
Bangladesh. It is a lethal offshoot of political use of religion, defective
education system and the socio-economic backwardness of the country. It
generates national security threats, creating bottlenecks in socio-economic and
political development. Despite many operational successes by the government of
Bangladesh and law enforcement agencies, they have achieved limited success in
disrupting terrorist contrives, ideologies, motivations and networking.
Evidently, a few of terrorist groups in Bangladesh have been attempting to
regroup, and networking in different names and structure. Some of the new
Islamist groups like Allahr Dal, Hizbut
Tauhid, and Hizbut Tahrir have
emerged in Bangladesh preaching ideologies by training, distributing books and
pamphlets among the common people and educational institutions, mainly in rural
areas. [3] It
has been reported that Hizbut Tauhid organised
a four-day training programme on board of a Boat on 4-7 April 2007 to
disseminate ideologies and operational techniques. The most frightening part is
that the group leaders prefer female trainees to motivate the local people,
especially the local women.[4] Thus,
the recent indicators suggest that terrorist threats to Bangladesh remain
foremost among its national security challenges. As such, the government would
need to maintain maximum monitoring, and operational and strategic efforts to
counter the constant evolution and adaptive capability of terrorist groups in
Bangladesh. To support these efforts, one has to understand the threat level,
group’s intention and
capabilities, and risks factors. Such being the necessity, this paper attempts
to map out the level of terrorism threats, challenges, risk factors for
Bangladesh and the possible responses to
minimise its impact on the society.
This paper is split into five sections. The
second section attempts to elaborate the concept of threat assessment to
understand the threat indicators. The third section examines the threat
indicators in the context of Bangladesh in order to create an adequate level of
awareness and preparedness that is critically needed for the country.
The fourth section highlights certain government initiatives and their
limitations in facing the menace of terrorism. The fifth section analyses the
threat level based on available indicators and applying SWOT [5] tools.
In the conclusion, some recommendations are put forward in order to minimise
the negative impact of terrorism on the society.
1.2 Statement of the
Problem
The security environment of Bangladesh is and
was always peaceful in comparison to many other countries of this region. In
respect to terrorist activities the country was in very low profile threat. If
we consider the population density and diversity of the population the
incidents are very normal and negligible. Last few years' terrorist activities
in this country got new dimension. Initially those were in very primitive type
and gradually things are becoming complex, difficult to
encounter/control/neutralize. Incident of 17 august 2005 was a massive shock in
our peaceful existence and it reminded us that we need to do something to stop
and finally come out of this evil cycle.
Though the number of incident was more but the magnitude and the
casualty was not that much. We may still call this as the beginning of the
coordinated terrorist activities and with our utmost sincerity and devotion the
country still can come out of this unwanted and unpleasant situation.
In last six years we are observing bomb
incidents in the country and the trend was going up. It was curved down by the
appropriate authority and the sincerity of the law enforcing agencies of the
country by adopting adequate counter measures. In the beginning there were many
unexploded bombs placed in different places. Explosives were
there but the bombs were not
functional. Some bomb threats were also there but the casualty related to this
types of incidents were not significant. Ten persons were killed in the bomb
incident that took place in 6 march 1999. We may take that as the beginning of
successful terrorist attempt to destabilize existing peace and
tranquility.
Unlike other countries of the world the
terrorist activities like this type of bomb incidents will have devastating
effect in our country. Our country is overcrowded and densely populated. If
some incident of this type takes place number of casualty will be more and
destruction of properties will be also more as everything is constructed in a
smaller area. Then there comes the secondary hazard. All these will actually act as problem
multiplier because we don’t have sufficient equipment and trained manpower to
combat these type of situation.
This article will primarily focus on bomb related
terrorist activities highlighting the major incidents occurred during the
period from 1980 to 2000’s in global perspective. There after recent trend of
growing terrorism in Bangladesh specially bomb related incidents will be
covered to reveal few measures for combating such incidents effectively.
1.3 Purpose
There are
two purposes of this study. They are-
1) Broad Objective:
To assess
the Terrorism and Its Preventive Mechanism in National and International
Levels.
2) Specific
Objectives:
·
To assess
the present scenario of terrorism in Bangladesh
·
To assess
the global terrorism activities
·
To assess
the preventive steps by national and international level
1.4 Significance of
the Study
Terrorism
is usually a cooperative crime in the sense that it involves more than one
individual. In this context, distrust between agents and principals may deter
crime ex ante and reveal information and evidence ex post. Legal mechanisms
that create distrust between different parties (e.g., plea-bargaining or
leniency programs) generate a chilling effect so that the different parties are
less likely to violate the law (since each party is afraid that the other will
make a deal with the authorities and provide incriminatory evidence). In the
case that a violation does happen, the same legal mechanism is useful to get
information and evidence from the different parties. Naturally well-designed
plea-bargaining or leniency programs increase the effectiveness of law
enforcement and reduce enforcement costs. However, if not well designed,
plea-bargaining could be counterproductive because it diminishes the expected
cost of illegal activities and thus it generates more terrorism (Garoupa 2005).
Chapter II
Background
2.1 Literature Review
Terrorism
is an underrated topic with vast effects on the society and according to
Lloca-Vivero (2008), the topic still remains relatively unexplored.
There has
been an increase of terrorism in the last thirteen years. The worst
international terrorist attack in history to date is the September 112001 Al
Quaeda attacks on the United States, stresses A.K Cronin (2004). The attack
left nearly 3000 people dead.
Terrorism
brings about fear. This makes it impossible for an individual to plan a trip
altogether. A tourist values safety. According to Koroma (2011), terrorism is
just like any other crime committed. Many steps are taken to prevent the crime
from occurring, but there are not enough resources such as funds and manpower
to comb every inch of the globe to eradicate terrorist threats. Henderson
(2008) however argues that there have been extensive strides in the monitoring
of terrorist groups and the prosecution of those that are identified as members
of a terrorist regime. This literature review serves to define terrorism and
analytically link it with the tourism and hospitality industry by surveying its
effects.
Terrorism Defined
Sonmez
(1998) defines terrorism as the calculated use of violence against civilians to
attain goods that are political or religious.
Enders
(2003) however defines terrorism as the premeditated use or threat of use of
violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social
objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the
immediate victim. Terrorism is therefore of a driven objective.
Effects of Terrorism Tourism and Hospitality
The
contribution of tourism and travel to both industrialized and developing
countries is now so great that down turns in the levels of activity in the
industry are a cause of concern. Kalia (2009)
For many
countries in the developing world tourism is a critical source of revenue
generation and major component of economic development. Kalia (2009) further
emphasizes that:
·
Manufacturers
of goods are negatively affected
·
Boarder
clearance costs rise
·
Cost of
insurance and re-insurance rise
·
Decline
in airline travel
·
Demands
for greater security
Mumbai
brings in 40% of foreign trade, 60% of customs duty collections, 40% of income
tax collections, 20% of central excess collections and 10billion in corporate
taxes. The Mumbai terror attack of 2008 has been the most dramatic in a long
series of terror attacks in India.
Tourist
visits were down to more than 17% in January 2009. In January 2009,
487 262 travellers came to India, compared to the 521 990, which was
a 17.6% decline. Kalia (2009)
Tourism
against tourists and in tourist destinations aims, among other things, to
prevent intercultural contacts and dialogue, Kalia (2009). According to Koroma
(2011), the impact of September 11 followed such that: there was a massive loss
of jobs from an enormous amount of cancellations of airlines. According to
Koroma (2011), some areas of the US suffered 60 to 70% decreases in occupancy
as well as major losses that totalled around 260 000.
Thompson
(2008) states that terrorism directly affects a tourist’s decision making.
Tourists may substitute between vacation spots if they feel threatened or
unsafe in a country. Fewer annual tourists as a result of terrorism will
typically result in losses of tourism revenue. Losses in terrorism revenue will
have a larger impact in those countries in which tourism constitutes a larger
percentage of GDP. To further emphasize
this factor Koroma (2001) states that: when terrorist threats occur in a
country, foreign tourists reconsider their decision to visit because the risk
involved has significantly increased. The risk of being a potential terrorist
target elicits a rapid negative customer response.
2.2 Definition of the
Terms
The words ’terrorism’ and ‘terror’ were
adopted from a French word ‘terreur’ which originates from the Latin word
‘terrere’ which means to frighten. During French revolution these were widely
used for the first time to indicate the reign of terror. Terrorism in present
context is a specialized and sometimes sophisticated and large scale criminal conduct.
It is mainly done to generate casualty of innocent and defenseless civilian,
destruction of properties, infrastructure and cultural sites.
In the past terrorism was there in many form.
Between the end of second world war and the 20th century total 120
armed conflicts occurred. In 20th century a person was killed in
every 21 second for 100 years from terrorist related activities. By the end of
the 20th century, the world had witnessed several new and horrifying forms of
terrorism, some even by the State, such as genocides, collectivization, purges,
crimes against humanity and mass casualty incidents.
Today, the terrorist is largely perceived as
an unknown, obscure and shadowy murderer, sometimes a religious fanatic, who
sets off bombs causing loss of life and great destruction in civilian
population centers. It is very sad that Islam is being exploited to legitimize
terrorist actions by different organizations, religious and spiritual leaders.
They try to legalize these in the name of jihad. The origin of all these types
of terrorism is mainly unstable middle east region. Terrorist may belong to any
religion though all the religion is against it. Currently Muslim fundamentalism
has got wide publicity in the western media.
Terrorism is carried out in many names
besides religion including politics, freedom, environment, racial supremacy,
animal rights etc. Terrorism and its motives are sometimes concealed and it is
necessary to appreciate that the motive for a given terrorist act, whether
declared by the terrorists, government or by media, may not always reflect the
truth.
There are no geographical boundaries for
terrorism. Almost in all the region of the world with different magnitude
terrorist activities are taking place. For combating terrorism existing police
force alone can no longer combat the magnitude of terrorism. Elements of armed forces, special forces,
national intelligence and security organizations are employed against
terrorism. Government of many countries have signed and confirmed agreements,
to suppress and combat terrorism as its magnitude is increasing gradually. After 11th September 2001 incident, many
countries have intensified their anti-terrorism efforts. Legislation is a
useful mechanism for legalizing special preventative measures taken by the
security forces. Anti-terrorism efforts have practically doubled in many
countries. In United Nations many new Resolutions against terrorism were
passed. Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) is effectively implementing the
efforts of UN against terrorism. During cold war era the face of terrorism was
different. Those were mainly supported and manipulated by WARSAW pact countries
in the form of guerrilla warfare. Then the middle east problem came up and
still it is continuing between Israel and other Arab nations. As a result,
whole middle east is in a state of unrest and the other parts of the world is
getting the heat of that. After the end of cold war new types of ruthless
terrorism emerged which is characterized by religious, political, ethnic and
social intolerance. General people normally come to know about the terrorist
act through media after the incident. In today’s world some Islamic terrorist
group or coalition are considered as
most dangerous. These groups distort Islam to justify their actions.
Their objective is to change the existing world order and establishment of
Islamic state in the world by terrorizing the world.
Essential Elements of Terrorism
There are some common and essential elements
in all cases of terrorism. Those are:
a.
Cause or
motive.
b.
Ends and
means.
c.
Ability.
d.
Calculation.
e.
Terror.
f.
Victim(s).
g.
Target(s).
Some
other elements may also be there like:
a.
Publicity.
b.
Demand(s).
c.
Coercion.
d.
Recognition.
In broader term most terrorism have four
interlinked factors. Those may be called as four pillars of terrorism. Those
are:
a.
Motivation.
b.
Objective.
c.
Target.
d.
Destruction
of asset and properties.
Motivation can be considered as a sleeping
partner. The objective of terrorists is the most important factor to them.
Objective comes first and motivation acts as driving force to attain that. The
other two pillars are, asset harm and target
are the outcome of that object. Mainly for attaining any object
terrorist need to select targets and the asset harm or destruction of property
is the outcome of the terrorist incident.
Terrorist Weapons, Resources, and Equipment
Terrorists use a wide range of military weapons and equipments. They collect those by illegal purchase, smuggle or by other unorthodox ways. The most common military weapons that terrorists frequently use are pistols, revolvers, rifles and submachine guns. Terrorists also use light machine guns, time-bombs, mortars, mines, rocket propelled grenades and handgrenades.
Most of the terrorists bombs are improvised.
They are termed as Improvised Explosive Devices or IEDs. It consists of a power
source, initiator, switches, explosive charge and a suitable container. Vehicles
can be converted easily to an IED. IEDs vary in quality and effect according to
the technology used and the explosive content. The mechanism can be made
complicated and sophisticated integrated circuitry can be incorporated in the
IEDs.
The devastating effect comes from the
explosion/ detonation of explosive charges used in it. Besides using
conventional explosives most terrorist use locally available chemicals or
commercial explosives. These are called Home Made Explosives(HME). Depending on
mixing ratio they give incendiary or explosion effect.
Assembling IEDs is dangerous. Accidents may
occur while assembling the IED and the assembler may even be blown up and
killed. Detonating IEDs is not as hazardous as constructing. IEDs may
accidentally explode while being transported by terrorists.
Suicide bombers are just another weapon in
the armory of terrorists . There is little protection from suicide terrorists
equipped with bombs. This type of terrorist is very dangerous and is able to
strike where terrorists who seek escape would not normally venture. They are
usually extremists motivated by fanatic interpretations of religion or
ideology, those on the edge of despair, or a combination of both. The aircrafts
used on 11 September 2001, were used as weapons by suicide terrorists.
The Media and Terrorism
Media can play vital role against terrorist
activities. Media gives terrorists their desired publicity. This publicity
sometimes install widespread fear among the common mass. This sometimes favors
the terrorists who wish to instill fear. Some media sources strongly condemn
terrorism for what it is. Some media sources intentionally minimize the
publicity afforded to terrorist groups and highlight successes and failures of
security forces. We can say that media can play duel role.
Media is
having enough flexibility to report terrorism in a responsible fashion,
especially when they know that most terrorists seek publicity to attain their
object. Role of media in September 2001 incident was well appreciated and
appropriate and helped security forces of the world to take necessary action
against that heinous acts.
Chapter III
Methodology
3.1 Theoretical
Framework
Terrorism is a threat to a wide range of
national security goals. This threat perception is concurrent with terrorists'
methods of operation, saliency of enemy and the treatment which is correlated
with the counter terrorism efforts. A study focuses on early warning indicators
of emerging terrorist threat for effective counter terrorism.[6] So,
it is important to understand threat, threat sources, and determinants of
terrorism. Although threat differs from place to place and time to time, the
perception of threat includes analysis of the indicators and vulnerabilities.
Identifying these indicators is the first step in the threat assessment
methodology. Risk is the likelihood of a given threat sources exercising a
particular potential vulnerability. Many use risk assessment to determine the
extent of the potential threat and the vulnerabilities associated with.
Vulnerability is a weakness that can be accidentally triggered or intentionally
exploited. A threat source does not present a risk when there is no
vulnerability. In determining the likelihood of a threat, one must consider threat
sources, potential vulnerabilities, and existing preventive mechanisms. Again,
threat assessment is the process of identifying risk, and taking steps to
minimise the threat and its impact on the society to an acceptable level. It is
the process that allows security experts/law enforcing agencies to secure the
state by adopting protective measures. The US Department of Homeland Security
defines threat assessment as “a systematic effort to identify and evaluate
existing or potential terrorist threats to a jurisdiction and its target
assets. Due to the difficulty in accurately assessing terrorist capabilities,
intentions, and tactics, threat assessments may yield only general information
about potential risks.”[7] A
constant and complete threat analysis with the combination of intelligence and
technologies is essential for an effective counter terrorism effort.
Threat sources are essential part of the
threat assessment. The important threat sources are motivation, resources and
threat action for carrying out an operation.
The analysis of motivation, resources, and capabilities is required in
order to determine the likelihood of threat, and listing the immediate threat
sources. One must need to compile those indicators to identify the risk and its
level by examining threat sources. For example, although successive attacks in
Europe in 2003 demonstrated the al-Qaeda's intentions, capabilities, and
opportunities for further attack, the European law enforcement agencies,
intelligence, and security forces did not take the threat seriously.[9] As
a result, several subsequent terrorist attacks took place in 2004 and 2005 in
Europe.
The threat assessment framework must
incorporate the comprehensive facts and profiles, review and analysis of
trends, and activities of state and non-state agencies and their drivers. The
figure-1 shows both organizational and operational factors like ideological
motivation, leadership pattern, recruitment pools, publicity, command and
control mechanism, operational space, training, technical know how, external weapon
sources, and financial sources, etc. have influenced terrorist groups’ intents
and capabilities.
Figure-2 shows several strategic and operational
determining factors of threat level that need to understand in designing a
counter terrorism strategy. An effective terrorism threat assessment framework
includes at least seven determining indicators: (i) existence of terrorist
group to a given locality, (ii) the capability of a terrorist group to carry
out an attack, (iii) evidence of group activities, (iv) intent of a group to
conduct terrorist activities, (v) demonstrated terrorist activities, (vi)
availability of credible information or intelligence activities that indicates
preparations for specific terrorist operations by a suspect group, and (vii)
political and security posture of the given area.[10]
Therefore, the threat assessment framework must need to take into account
all strategic, operational and tactical factors, as well as all new trends in
terrorist activities that are increasingly networked, more diverse in terms of
motivations, financing, and security implications.
3.2 Terrorism in
Bangladesh
According
to the above-mentioned indicators, the probability of the potential terrorist
threat cannot be ignored in Bangladesh. The existence of the terrorist groups
and evidence of their activities are noticeable in the country. According to a
study on threat prediction for 2008-2015 for Bangladesh, terrorism scores very
high in the lists of threat to national security of the country.[11] Due
to the continuous drive by the law and security forces, the extremist groups
are moving in slow pace. But many banned militant groups are still regrouping
by changing their names and operation techniques. The following section
attempts to address current trends of terrorism in Bangladesh to understand the
threat in a framework.
The
presence of the extremist groups in a certain territory and its neighbours is
the foremost indicator to understand the threat of terrorism. Bangladesh fits
very well in this ground. Over time, due to the political use of religion and
the presence of ungoverned political spaces in the state domain, the
extremists’ activities have increased in Bangladesh. The country has been
experiencing two types of extremism. First, the Islamist extremism by the
right-wing Islamist groups, and the second is political extremism by the
ultra-left-wing political groups. Most of the groups’ tactics are to create a
fear of violence in Bangladesh by assassinating public figures and bombing
public places. The menace of political violence is a historical phenomenon. The
ultra-left-wing activities originated since the Independence of the country
whereas the religion based violence activities originated before Independence.
However, extremist groups are operating in Bangladesh in different names and
forms. Although the total number is not reported, the active groups those are
pursuing currently their goals are: Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-IslamiBangladesh
HuJIB, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh JMB, Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), Hizbut Tauhid (HT), Allahr Dal (AD), Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT),
Purba Banglar Communist Party (PBCP),
Red Flag (RF), Gono Mukti Fouz (GMF), Biplobi Communist Party (BCP), Purbo Banglar Sabrahara Party (PBSP), Janajuddho, Gono Bahini (GB), Mukti
Bahini (MB) etc. Box-1 shows different proscribed groups, many of them are
still active in different names and forms. The religion based extremist groups
are operating across the country and the ultra-leftist groups are concentrating
mainly in the north and south western districts of the country. It has been
recently documented that the ultra-leftist groups are trying to expand their
networking and activities. For instances, BCP, Gono Bahini, GMF and the Mukti
Bahini are regrouping in the south-western districts to strengthen their
capability. [12] It
is also alleged that the PBCP has regrouped in Khulna City and establishing
network to the different areas of Sirajganj, Natore, Manikganj,
Rajbari and Pabna districts.[13]
Box-1: Some of the proscribed groups in
Bangladesh
|
1.
Shahadat-e-Al-Hikma
(S-e-H)
2.
Al
Haramaine Islamic Foundation (AHIF)
3.
Jagrata
Muslim Janata, Bangladesh (JMJB)
4.
Jamat-ul-Mujahideen
Bangladesh (JMB)
5.
Harkat-ul-Jehad
Al IslamiBangladesh (HuJIB)
6.
Gono
Mukti Fouz (GMF)
7.
Gono
Bahini (GB)
8.
Biplobi
Communist Party (BCP)
|
9.
The
Purbo Banglar Communist Party-ML (PBCP-ML)
10.
PBCP-Janajuddha
11.
PBCP-
Red Flag
12.
PBCP-
Communist War
13.
New
Biplobi Communist Party
(NBCP)
14.
Biplabi
Anuragi
15.
Chinnamu
Communist Party (CCP)
16.
Sharbahara
People's March
|
On the
other hand, there are two types of area where most of the religion based
extremist groups are conducting their activities: (i) the strategic vicinity
where groups take decisions, maintain command and control, conduct training and
ideological motivations, and regroup when necessary, etc. and (ii) the
operational vicinity where they conduct their targeted operations. Strategic
environment mainly covers rural and far-flung areas, chars and haors, etc.
These areas are mainly chosen to escape from the security forces. The
operational areas are public and cultural places, areas of public institutions
and infrastructures, etc. Furthermore, the number of power-seeking extremists
is increasing in Bangladesh. They try to capture political and social power
through the use of violence in the society. They frequently display their
political and economic strength in the form of arranging meeting, procession,
and participating in electoral activities in Bangladesh. The power seeking
leaders, who want to use religion as a tool, are facilitating extremism in the
society. Religious and political ideological contradictions, rigid religious
beliefs, socioeconomic factors like poverty, unequal job opportunities, hunger,
backwardness and unemployment have also significantly contributing to the rise
of extremism in Bangladesh.
Beside
these rightist and ultra-leftist groups, some insurgent groups such as Parbatya
Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS), Rohingya Solidarity Organization
(RSO), etc. are also seen to be active in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Although
the Peace Accord was signed in 1997, there has been concern and possibility of
a return to violence. Following the signing of the Accord, any threat assessment
was hardly found to have been done in order to understand the possibilities of
threats in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The RSO is also a formidable group,
which has come from Myanmar. It has been alleged that this group has links with
extremist groups in Southeast and Central Asia.
The India’s North-Eastern insurgent groups are also alleged to be
engaged in conducting arms training in different areas of Chittagong and Cox’s
Bazar in Bangladesh.[14]
Groups’
activities and capabilities are another significant indicator to understand
terrorism threat. It has been observed that many extremist groups have carried
out their activities across the country. They recently have changed their
recruiting pools. Currently, they are recruiting new members by religious propaganda
through distributing pamphlet, handbills, books, CD-ROM, etc. According to the Daily Star report, the dispersed members
of extremist groups are now regrouping in their former places, mainly in the
areas of three south-Western districts namely Kushtia, Meherpur, and Chuadanga.
[15] However,
the security forces have captured second front-line leaders of different groups
and recovered grenades and bombs from different places of the country. A second
front-line leader of a proscribed Islamist extremist group HuJIB, Abu Zindal,
was arrested from Gazipur on 14 February 2008. Following his statement,
security forces also captured Md. Nazrul Islam Gharami from a far-flung village
of Satkhira. Subsequently, based on their confession, law enforcement forces
carried out raid and recovered 41 Arges powerful grenades from the underside of
the ground near a pond. It was alarmingly found that the grenades recovered
from Satkhira were recently manufactured, and planned to demonstrate groups’
presence and strength, particularly in the situations when the top leaders of
the different militant groups were hanged or detained. It has been noticed that
some of the comparatively new extremist groups are active and showing their
capability. The groups like Allar Dal and
Hizbut Tauhid are trying to reinforce
their network. These groups are almost legally operating their activities since
they are not yet proscribed by the government. Evidence shows that some of
these groups were very active and held public demonstration against the Shaptahik 2000 and the Daily Prothom Alo over the sensitive
issues. It has also found that some of the detained activists planned to revolt
in Chittagong jail and some also threatened to fire the Petrobangla building.[16] Again,
three small bombs were found at railway stations in Dhaka, Chittagong and
Sylhet. However, all these evidences show the capability and strength of the
extremist groups to carry out any fresh attack.
The
motivation factors are also important indicator that can be used by the group
leaders to strengthen their organizational capability. Mainly, some distorted
ideologies and principles which are not supported by the religious scripts have
been motivating group members. There are different kinds of motivations and
strategic factors causing extremism and violence in Bangladesh, such as (i)
ideological motivation, (ii) experimental and destructive motivation, (iii)
profit-driven motivation, and (iv) motivation to achieve acknowledgement. There
are other related factors that can also generate extremist motivation, like (i)
un-uniformed national education structure and curricula, (ii) proliferation of
unregulated religion-based institutions and organizations, particularly in
rural areas, (iii) rigid religious beliefs and grievances, (iv) misinterpretation
of religious ideologies that justifies violence and extreme activities, (v)
wide spread poverty and illiteracy of the mass people, (vi) political
instability, (vii) violent radicalization of individuals or groups, and (viii)
international connectivity, etc. The existing four streams of education in
Bangladesh are in contrast with the Constitutional obligations of the unitary
form of education. Both secular and religiously fundamental components are
inbuilt in education system. The religious schools, approximately numbered
64,000,[17] are
divided into two distinct categories. The Aliya
madrassas are run by the government support and control, and teach Arabic,
religious theory and other Islamic subjects as well as
English, mathematics, science and history. The
Qaumi madrassas are more traditional,
and teach Islamic literature and ideologies, Sharia law, Arabic and Urdu languages, etc. In most of the cases,
after finishing education, students are incapable of taking up any mainstream
profession, and madrassas and the
religious institutions are main sources of their employment. There are also
elementary level religious schools in Bangladesh known as maktabs, or ibtedai madrassas
running since 1978. However, the entire religious education system is
poorly equipped to increase the capacity of students. The scope of standard
education in madrassa is available
only to a few. They can be easily motivated by capitalizing religious sentiment
to create extremism.
The
presence of threat groups and insurgent activities in the neighbouring
countries is also a threat indicator. Bangladesh is not immune from these
challenges. There are several insurgents groups in the Indian North-eastern
areas running their activities very near to the Bangladesh-India border. This
problem multiplies due to the porous border, incomplete demarcation and absence
of effective border mechanisms, illegal activities on the border, and the lack
of mutual trust, etc. In some cases, the difficult hilly terrain makes it more
complicated to establish control over the border to check illegal crossing from
Myanmar and India. The maritime borders are also not fully protected.
Bangladesh’s coastal belts are highly vulnerable for two reasons: first, the
coastal areas can be used as strategic vicinity to take decisions, training and
motivations for terrorist groups’ and second, these areas are easily accessible
by the foreign sources making the most use of the maritime routes.
Particularly, the open Sea Islands are highly vulnerable to the potential use
of the threat groups. For instance, among others, Kutubdia and Moheshkhali are
the two likely open Sea Islands that can be extremely exploited by the threat
groups.
3.3 Analysis Plan
The collected data has analyzed as per requirement
of the research. In 1980’s we saw that
the incidents took place mainly in Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Pakistan
,USA, Vietnam and Palestine. During this period political unrest prevailed in
these countries. In some countries transition of political power were going on.
We just cannot draw a conclusion that middle east or Palestine was the only
problem prone area. Number of incidents and the death occurred during this
period throughout the world due to terrorist bomb activities are shown in the
graph below:
Terrorist incidents were less in 1990’s than
that of 1980’s. Because , during this period states took effective measures to
counter terrorism. The effectiveness of anti terrorist force were improved.
They were well trained and equipped by the government. Terrorism gets the
exposure to explosives, small and medium arms
more easily after the end of cold war. They are using those
explosives to terrorize the world. Number of incidents and the deaths during
this period are shown in figure 3and 4 below:
Most of these incidents took place in Iraq,
Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey and other
places. In 2002 explosion took place in Israel, Kenya, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Chechnya AND Tunisia etc. Many incident took place in European countries like
Spain, Italy and UK(Northern Ireland); South American countries like Argentina,
Columbia and Peru etc. From January 2006 till June
2006 total of 6000 personal died in different
terrorist incident in Iraq. (BBC, This Week, 11 June 2006) It clearly says that
the unrest is not confined in a region rather whole world is in a state of
unrest.
Bangladesh Incidents
Since independence the first bomb explosion took place in a public meeting in 1981. In that incident
one person was killed. That was the beginning of terrorist attack using the
bomb culture in Bangladesh. Though there was no significant upraise of the
trend immediately after the incident. However, suddenly in 1999-2000 a total of
six bomb explosions took place in various parts of the country. During the year
2001 the situation aggravated to a great extent. Only in two incidents 32
people were killed in 2001.
On 07 Mar 1999’s explosion 8 people were
killed and 150 injured. In same month in another powerful explosion two persons
were killed on the spot and more three were injured. On 08 October 1999,
another powerful bomb explosion took place at Kadiani Mosque in Khulna where 06
person’s were died on the spot and 40 were critically injured.
On 20th Jan 2001 in two separate
bomb incidents total six persons died on spot and several others were injured.
Ramna Botomul incident on 14 April 2001 snuffed out nine lives and injured
many. Seven individual died on spot and almost 30 others were injured on 3 June
2001 in Catholic Church at Baniarchar in Gopalgonj district. 22 persons were killed and nearly
100 injured in a massive bomb explosion at a political party office in
Narayanganj.
Total 438 Improvised Explosives Device
(IED)/Bombs were exploded at different places of 4 Metropolitan Cities and 63
district headquarters of Bangladesh on 17 August 2005. In those incidents; 02
people died and approximately 150 were injured. The bombs/IED's were locally
prepared with a timer circuit but with less lethality. The power source of the
bombs were four pencil AA batteries. The circuit was timed, controlled by a
switch and the detonator was electric. A small amount of Gunpowder (GP) and
Aluminum based Home Made Explosive (HME) was used for sound & igneferous
effect.
From 1999
to 2005 there were approximately 492 bomb, grenade and cocktail incident
where 271 people died and more than one thousand were injured. The above
mentioned incidents clearly reflects a sharp and alarming rise of bomb related
terrorist activities in Bangladesh which can no more be ignored. To combat all these terrorist activities we need to
know regarding terrorism and terrorist activities, chronological development,
their logistical backup, method and the weapon they use to attain their objectives. Table below
shows some major incidents that took place in Bangladesh:
Table 1: Some Major Bomb Incidents in Bangladesh 1999- July 2005
|
Year
|
Month
|
Place
|
Death
|
Remarks
|
|
1999
|
March
|
Jessor
|
10
|
|
|
|
October
|
Khulna
|
8
|
|
|
2001
|
January
|
Dhaka
|
4
|
|
|
|
|
Dhaka
|
3
|
|
|
|
April
|
Dhaka
|
10
|
|
|
2002
|
December
|
Mymensing
|
21
|
|
|
2004
|
January
|
Tangail
|
7
|
|
|
|
|
Sylhet
|
5
|
|
|
|
|
Khulna
|
1
|
|
|
|
March
|
Bagerhat
|
1
|
|
|
|
|
Khulna
|
1
|
|
|
|
May
|
Sylhet
|
3
|
|
|
|
|
Khulna
|
1
|
|
|
|
August
|
Dhaka
|
23
|
|
|
2005
|
January
|
Bogra
|
1
|
|
|
|
June
|
Gopalgonj
|
10
|
|
|
|
|
N.gonj
|
22
|
|
|
|
September
|
Bagerhat
|
8
|
|
|
|
|
Sunamgonj
|
4
|
|
|
|
|
Satkhira
|
3
|
|
source : Daily Jugantar, August 2005
In Bangladesh in most of the cases the
terrorist exploited Islam to justify
their misdeeds. But actually Islam means peace and it really mean so.
That’s why the terrorists are not getting popular support. The reasons for rise
of terrorism in Bangladesh may be summarized as
following
:
a.
Poor
financial backup.
b.
Ever-continuing
economic crises.
c.
Extreme
poverty.
d.
Illiteracy.
e.
Unemployment.
f.
Uncertainty
regarding future.
g.
Exploitation
of simple religious believe.
Threat assessment
Present time is always best time. Without
delay we must prepare ourselves to counter the terrorist acts that are growing
in our country. If we can suppress and eradicate these types of act in the beginning,
then we will be able to revert the fate of country and can tell that we are
still peaceful and our people will be living in peace and harmony.
Assessing the threat profile and continuously
monitoring and updating is the first step. Next step is to prepare the security
and intelligence organization. It can be done by creating special cells and
train personnel on different aspect of terrorist acts including tracking,
preventing , forensic activities and data management. Then, Identify and
motivate the potential/ vulnerable groups and
prevent them from joining in terrorist groups/activities. Finally,
existing laws if required to be updated for quick disposal of the cases.
Exemplary punishment may be awarded so
that people are aware and terrorists are cautious.
A threat assessment is necessary to evaluate
the potential loss in these situations. This will help to examine what action
can be taken to prevent or minimize those loss. Whether such action is an
affordable option in financial and political terms to be also evaluated. Prime
requirement is to precisely identify the threat. A typical threat assessment
might include the following:
a.
Detailed
profile of potential or actual threat, hostile forces and likely outcome.
b.
Character,
disposition and vulnerability of all human resources.
c.
Nature
and disposition of fixed structures and moveable assets.
d.
Preliminary
assessment of potential loss.
The conclusion of a threat assessment often
concludes with a change of level in a security alertness plan. It may be
higher, lower or be maintained at the same level. There are several different
levels or phases in such plans or systems.
Joint Efforts to Counter Terrorist Acts.
Terrorist activities (Bomb/IED situation) cannot
be tackled in piecemeal by a single agency. It necessitates a well-coordinated
effort of all fractions of the society. Under the prevailing IED situation in
our country and appreciating the future trends following joint efforts are
recommended :
a.
A well
coordinated interaction between the law enforcing agencies (intelligence and
police) and the military experts need to be established and maintained
throughout.
b.
Security
Forces need to be trained both at home and abroad. They must be proactive.
Modern equipments should be used to combat the increasing threat. Use of resources may include:
(1)
Overall
budget and financial expenditure.
(2)
Human
resources e.g. Close protection officers.
(3)
Equipment
resources e.g. bomb detection devices, vehicles.
(4)
More
powerful and task-orientated weaponry.
c.
The
intelligence network to be made effective in maintaining information related to
availability of explosive for a bomb threat. Increased security intelligence
can be gathered from:
(1)
Human
Intelligence e.g. Open Source collection
and Covert Operations.
(2)
Satellite
Intelligence e.g. Imaging Intelligence.
(3)
Signals
Intelligence e.g. Electronic Intercept.
(4)
Information
Warfare e.g. Propaganda / disinformation and IT attack.
d.
Trans
frontier intelligence activities must be geared up so that it enables concern
people to become pro-active to blast incident.
e.
Restriction
need to be imposed on selling and buying of readily available ingredients of homemade
explosive i.e. gasoline, ammonium nitrate, potassium nitrate etc.
f.
Awareness
of general people needs to be increased through various electronic media and newspaper.
g.
Media to
be used to project the heinous act and
motivate people not to support terrorism. To minimize panic,
motivational broadcasting in radio and TV, telecasting of documentary films,
social campaign like posters, placards, holding seminars etc can be arranged.
h.
Fastest
investigation, quick trial and exemplary punishment of the miscreants to be
ensured.
j. Intellectuals have great role in
countering the bomb culture. This society must put their magic to build an
intimated social bond all over the nation.
THREAT LEVEL IN BANGLADESH
With the threat indicators identified and
analysed above, it is now appropriate to determine the level of terrorism
threat in Bangladesh, which may help in designing a viable counter-terrorism
strategy. If we start with the ‘Udichi’ bomb
blast of 1999 in Dhaka, the impact of the events of 9/11 and the subsequent
US-led global war on terrorism and the continuous operational drive by the law
enforcement agencies, where does Bangladesh stand? Has the risk of terrorism
diminished or increased? Have the plans and abilities of radical groups to
conduct terrorist acts reduced or increased? What is the possibility of any
further attack? This section attempts to address these questions by using the
Aon terrorism risk map 2007 and SWOT analysis.
Terrorism Risk Map 2007 and Bangladesh
The Aon Corporation25 has
published terrorism risk map 2007 that provides a visual guide to understand
the risk management calculating threats in over 200 countries. It shows the
changing trends of the terrorism threat level for 2007 indicating a major
downfall of the world wide umbrella groups. Particularly these groups are
increasingly splintered and have a hard time in coordinating their plans and
activities. This has reduced the terrorism threat in some areas. However,
despite increasing cooperation among states and international agencies, the
efforts directed against one threat groups in a particular place have not been
effective at regional and international level.
According to the map, the risk of terrorism since 2006 has decreased in
23 countries and the risk level elevated in 22 countries. Bangladesh falls in
the list of states where terrorism threat level has increased along with other
states such as India, Iran and four Western countries- UK, France, Norway and
Canada (see box-2). In the map, states are coloured according to the level of
threat conditions, and various symbols demonstrate different types of terrorist
groups. The global cities with high risk are also highlighted.
3.4 Scope and
Limitations
This study has conducted national and international terrorism
and preventive methods as per the law enforcing authorities. There are some limitations
of the study which are-
·
Lack of data
·
Lack of previous research work
·
Time limitation
Chapter IV
Results
4.1 Results
4.1 Steps Taken by
the Government
Terrorists take advantages from the
weaknesses of a state or a government to finance, organize, equip, train,
recruits, carry out attacks, and hide from the capture by the law and security
forces. Therefore, understanding the government response is a vital factor to
assess terrorism threats for a country. The government is responsible to take
the most appropriate steps to protect its citizens from the threats of
terrorism. Again, the government is well placed to assess the threat for the
country. The government responses to the threat of terrorism can be seen at
different levels – operational activities by law enforcement and security
agencies, legislations, international cooperation, tactical methods, new ideas
to combat the root causes of terrorism, etc. Thus, the government is in a
position to develop a comprehensive counter terrorism strategy with the help of
other nonstate actors.
The Bangladesh government has been
implementing several plans and strategies to counter idiosyncratic nature of
terrorism threat in the country. The government initiatives can be categorized
into two types: (i) operational drives by the law and security forces, and (ii)
legal initiatives. During 2002-2003, operations ‘clean heart’ and ‘spider web’
were launched to capture threat elements in the society.
The law and security forces achieved some operational success in
disrupting command and control structure of several extremist groups. A large
number of extremist leaders and activists have been captured, put on trial and
executed. A great deal of arms, explosives and grenades have been recovered. In
the past one year, the security forces have arrested 153 leaders and/or
activists from both the rightwing and ultra-left-wing extremist groups. But
their success in other operational spheres like disrupting financial and
support bases, profiling terrorist individuals, groups, and organizations, and
mapping out vulnerabilities and opportunities of threat, etc. is limited. In
most of the cases, the government has taken coercive, peace, amnesty and
negotiating approaches to minimise the terrorist threat.[19]
The government has enacted a few special legislations to counter the
threat of terrorism in Bangladesh. On 11 June 2008, the AntiTerrorism Ordinance
2008 was approved by the government with the provisions of penalty for offences
like arms running and financing terror attacks, and committing murders to
create panic and endanger the country's sovereignty.[20]
The new counter terrorism legislation has kept maximum punishment - a
death sentence - for terrorist activities. Besides, there are provisions to
punish individuals for any kind of association with proscribed organizations
and for carrying out propaganda on behalf of such organizations. The new law
has recognized that financing terrorism is a subject liable to punishment. Any
individuals and organizations involved in financing terrorism will be punished.
There is a provision for the creation of special tribunals in the new law to
prosecute individuals charged under this law. The Bangladesh Bank has been
delegated with the responsibility of monitoring and countering the financing of
terrorism.[21] Earlier,
the Bangladesh government also approved the Anti-Money Laundering Prevention
Ordinance 2008 with effect from 13 April 2008.[22]
Despite the shortcomings in and confusion over these two Ordinances,
Bangladesh has got a strong legal leverage to prevent terror financing
activities. It is not enactment, but the problem comes from the implementation
deficits. On many counts, different provisions of the laws remain
unimplemented.
For that reason, the government institutions
have a vital role in implementing strategies and legal provisions. In this
regard, the architecture of different institutions and agencies are important
to combat the menace of terrorism. The Bangladesh Police, the Rapid Action
Battalion (RAB), Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), armed forces and intelligence
agencies are mainly responsible for fighting terrorism and insurgency. Apart
from keeping the law and order, Bangladesh police is recovering illegal arms
and explosive and arresting leaders and activists of different terrorist
groups. It has been frequently argued that the police is not that well equipped
to deal with the new trends of terrorism which is now more ideology- and technology
centric. Apart from ensuring border security, BDR has been playing an active
role in fighting against terrorism related activities in the country.
Subsequently, RAB was created to reinforce the operational drive by the
government. The RAB has been engaged with the protection of internal security,
recovery of unauthorized arms, ammunition, explosive, assisting other law
enforcement agencies, intelligence gathering, carrying out surveillance in the
crime prone areas, etc.[23] Military
forces and intelligence agencies are critically important to combat threat of
terrorism. The armed forces are mainly providing intelligence gathering
support, training support, backing and logistics support to other law
enforcement and paramilitary forces. The armed forces of Bangladesh also
provide training to police, paramilitary and other law enforcement forces to
carry out operations against threat activities. The intelligence agencies are
essential apparatus in support of operational activities. Mainly, the National
Security Intelligence (NSI), the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence
(DGFI), services intelligence, Special Branch of Police and the RAB
intelligence wing, etc. have been working in support of civil administration to
identify the potential threat sources and conducting operational activities. In
May 2004, NSI constituted a separate body called ‘counter terrorism cell’ to
identify specific risk population and areas, and threat groups. The ‘counter
terrorism bureau’, another body under the auspices of DGFI, has been working
to evaluate, analyse, and frame counter terrorism policy at strategic
and operational level.24
As it has been observed, there are several
deficiencies at different levels of anti-terrorism manoeuvres. First, the
profiling of threat groups and the early detection indicators are not
sufficient to face new actors and techniques of terrorism. There is a lack of
knowledge and understanding of the ideologies, organizations and operations of
the threat groups. Second, the law enforcement agencies do not have close link
with the other service sectors to identify suspicious activities to prevent
terrorist activities. Third, the government is not strategically,
operationally, and tactically fully capable of handling the problem. The
Bangladesh government is not sufficiently addressing strategic issues like
dismantling motivation, ideologies and support base of the threat groups.
Operationally, law enforcement agencies are not adequately developed in dealing
with the technology of terrorism. At a tactical level, there is very limited
scope for the members of law enforcement, security and intelligence services to
be trained or retrained to understand and respond to the threat of terrorism. A
number of inadequacies have been identified in the armed forces, such as short
supply of trained manpower in counter terrorism, lack of intelligence gadgets
and equipment, inexperience in anti-money laundering, information insecurity,
etc. Fourth, there is a lack of general consensus for all-out drive against
terrorism and extremism. Fifth, there is a very limited initiative to educate
formally and informally professional groups like academics, media community,
service sector officials, and political leaders to be aware of and sensitized
about the terrorist activities.
Sixth, the overall strategic responses are
still inadequate. The counter ideology or motivations and de-radicalization
measures are almost absent in the architecture of maximum institutions. In
fact, there is hardly any institution in Bangladesh to address different kinds
of motivation factors, like ideological and experimental motivation,
destructive and profit driven motivation, motivation to gain acknowledgement,
etc. Furthermore, there are poor commitments in political society, lack of
coordination among the anti-terrorist alliances, insufficient role of academics
and media to address the challenges of extremism and terrorism. Seventh, there
is a tendency to overemphasise military and coercive approaches in dealing with
terrorism issues. There is no dedicated research institution in the government
to provide forum for understanding and research on critical issues of terrorism
in Bangladesh. Although the counter terrorism bureau of DGFI is responsible for
policy related activities, it is barely possible to workout a viable strategy
by a body of armed forces alone. Finally, it may be mentioned that, in
Bangladesh, strategies and policies are preoccupied with process, highly
centralized, overly bureaucratic, too ambiguous, unaccountable and
unresponsive. Most of the initiatives are overly focusing on macro issues, not
on micro issues and actors like ideology, motivation, and propaganda
activities, empowerment of the individual, etc. to promote counter terrorism
discourse.
4.2 Terrorism
and International Law
On 11 September
2001 commercial passenger jets hijacked by suicide commandos were flown into
the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York. As the Towers imploded
and collapsed, the death of several thousand people was witnessed live on
television screens throughout the world. Those attacks, together with that on
the Pentagon and the failed attempt that ended in Pennsylvania, aroused
profound indignation and led to immediate reactions against the perpetrators or
their protectors and sponsors, and more generally against international
terrorism.
Some
commentators felt that international law was left dumbfounded, incapable of
giving a name to these events, which did not seem to fall under any of its
established categories. For those observers, the law had been seriously
challenged by the impact of 1 1 September, and a whole new law was emerging.
But, as time went by, others observed that it was in fact possible to find
solutions to the issues raised within the existing law, and that legal
responses simply had to be fine-tuned to address this new situation.
So what
conclusions can be drawn from this? Has international law succeeded in finding
a generally accepted definition of terrorism? Has it set up agreed measures for
the prevention and punishment of terrorist acts? And finally, does it provide
adequate mechanisms for action against States which aid and abet terrorism?
These are the three questions that I shall address here.
What is
terrorism? How can it be characterized in law, and in particular international law?
The
notion of terrorism is obviously related to that of 'terror'. In the most
general sense, that term denotes an extreme fear, usually stemming from a
vaguely perceived, relatively unknown and largely unforeseeable threat. In this
sense, terror can be caused by human action but also by natural disasters such
as volcanic eruptions or earthquakes.
However,
the word 'terror' took on a new meaning at the end of the eighteenth century
during the French Revolution, when, threatened with a foreign invasion and
civil unrest, the Convention proclaimed the 'Terror' in 1793 and under that
head adopted a series of exceptional measures that were to be implemented by
the Committee of Public Safety under the authority of Robespierre. In 1794 he
was overthrown and then executed. But in condemning him the
* Judge
and former President of the International Court of Justice. This is the text of
the 2003 Grotius Lecture delivered by HE Gilbert Guillaume at the British
Institute of International and Comparative Law on 13 November 2003. [ICLQ vol
53, July 2004 pp 537-548]
Convention
could not claim he was responsible for the Terror that they themselves had
proclaimed. So they accused him of 'terrorism' , a term which from the outset
thus referred to the use of terror by the State.
The term
was to take on a new meaning in the late nineteenth century. The attacks
perpetrated in Russia by the Nihilists, then throughout Europe by the
Anarchists, were to be described as 'terrorist'. As a result, terrorism came to
refer not only to terror used by the State but also to that used against the
State.
The two
meanings remained commonplace throughout the first half of the twentieth
century. In 1920 Trotsky wrote an apologia of terrorisml in which he justified
State terror when used in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
However, in the following decade, after the assassination in 1934 of King
Alexander of Yugoslavia, the League of Nations drew up two stillborn
conventions, one of which provided for the prevention and suppression of that
type of terrorist act.
State
terror has unfortunately thrived over the past half century. But there has also
been a considerable rise in anti-State terrorism, which is the type of action
now usually referred to by the term 'terrorism' in everyday parlance.
The
reason why such terrorism has become widespread in the world today is because
it provides a highly advantageous method of combat, with its potential for
significant results at limited human and financial cost. Technical progress has
played an essential role in this regard. Nitroglycerine or mercury bombs have
been replaced by remote-controlled devices that are increasingly difficult to
detect. The growing fragility of our civilization has increased the number of
sensitive targets as it has the means of escape. Lastly, the development of
mass media has enabled terrorists to put across their message more effectively
and, through the press and television, to accentuate the terror they seek to
spread. Impassioned feelings, or indeed fanaticism, have further increased the
risks.
Faced
with this situation, governments have not simply remained on the sidelines.
Since 1963, various decisions and conventions have been adopted within the
United Nations, specialized agencies and regional organizations, particularly
within Europe.
For
decades the authors of these instruments for the prevention and suppression of
offences including certain acts of terrorism have, however, refrained from
using or defining the term 'terrorism' itself. They have preferred to focus on
the prosecution or extradition of perpetrators of certain designated acts such
as the hijacking of aircraft, acts of violence against aircraft, airports,
ships and oil platforms, attacks on diplomats or hostagetaking? This prudence
indeed explains the success of the various conventions
I Leon
Trotsky In Defence of Terrorism (London Allen & Unwin 1935); see also
'Défense du terrorisme' Nouvelle Revue Critique 1935, in particular at 23 and
76.
2 See the
Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 16 Dec
1970; Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation, 23 Sept 1971; Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes against
539
thus
concluded under the auspices of the ICAO, the IMO or the United Nations, now
binding on the vast majority of States. (The Hague Convention of 1970 for the
Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft has, for example, been ratified
by some 180 countries.)
The
discussions that took place at the time, in both Strasbourg and New York,
illustrated the difficulty of finding a unanimously accepted definition of
terrorism. The Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism set up by the United
Nations General Assembly attempted to achieve this between 1972 and 1979. But
it was unable to succeed because, during the debates, the members of the Group
of 77 repeatedly emphasized the legitimacy of actions by national liberation
movements and demanded that such actions should in no way be confused with
terrorism. It appeared then and later
that, quite often, according to a commonplace of our times, 'one person's
terrorist is another person's freedom fighter'.
The
wisdom of the draftsmen of those early conventions which sought to combat
terrorism without actually naming it as such, was however short-lived. In the
1990s, the term 'terrorism' reappeared under the pressure of politicians, the
media and NGOs, first of all in press releases, unilateral declarations or
other so-called 'soft law' texts, then in international conventions. In 1977,
the Council of Europe had already drawn up a convention on the suppression of
terrorism, but had omitted to provide any definition of the term Twenty years later a convention was drawn up
by the United Nations for the suppression of terrorist bombings, but came no
closer to defining 'terrorism' It was
only in 1999 that a convention signed in New York for the suppression of the
financing of terrorism made a first attempt at a definition, the result being
unhappily inconclusive. It was somewhat
paradoxical—at least at first glance—that the international community was
seeking to suppress terrorism but could not really pinpoint its meaning.
The 11
September events did not herald any change of direction in this respect. The
Security Council, in its Resolution 1368 of 12 September 2001,
Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, New York, 14 Dec 1973;
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, New York, 17 Dec 1979;
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports serving
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Montreal Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 24 Feb 1988;
Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, 10 Mar 1988, and the Protocol to the abovementioned
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms located on the Continental Shelf.
called on
the international community to 'redouble their efforts to prevent and suppress
terrorist acts'. Later on, in Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001, the Council
decided upon a certain number of appropriate measures to be taken by States.
However, the Council failed to provide any clarification as to what it meant by
'terrorism'. Moreover, India presented a proposal to the United Nations General
Assembly for a comprehensive convention against international terrorism, which
has been unsuccessful due to the failure to agree on the scope of the
Convention, that is to say, once again, on a definition of terrorism The same difficulties were encountered in
the preparation of a draft convention on the suppression of acts of nuclear
terrorism It was only in the context of
the European Union that an attempt was made to lay down such a definition,
although with somewhat complex and uncertain wording, in a 2002 Framework
Decision on combating terrorism.
To combat
terrorism without defining it remained possible for as long as the word itself
was not uttered. However, to make use of the term as we do today, often without
determining its true scope, does carry certain drawbacks. It tends to give rise
to uncertainty and leaves States the possibility of making unilateral
interpretations geared towards their own interests, particularly with respect
to Security Council resolutions. It would thus be helpful to attempt to provide
such a definition, taking as a basis the few texts that have endeavoured to do
so.
In the
context of international law, it would appear to me that the adjective
'terrorist' may be applied to any criminal activity involving the use of
violence in circumstances likely to cause bodily harm or a threat to human
life, in connection with an enterprise whose aim is to provoke terror. Three conditions
thus have to be met: (a) the perpetration of certain acts of violence capable
of causing death, or at the very least severe physical injury. Certain texts of
domestic and European law go further than this, however, and consider that the
destruction of property even without any danger for human life may also
constitute a terrorist act; (b) an individual or collective enterprise that is
not simply improvised, in other words an organized operation or concerted plan
reflected in coordinated efforts to achieve a specific goal (which, for
example, excludes the case of the deranged killer who shoots at everyone in
sight); (c) the pursuit of an objective: to create terror among certain
predetermined persons, groups or, more commonly, the public at large (thus
differentiating terrorism from the political assassination of a single
personality, such as that of Julius Caesar by Brutus).
In this
respect a distinction should be made between the victim that the terrorist
seeks to harm, the target that he wishes to attain and the results he is
looking to secure. Terrorism is a method of combat in which the victims are not
chosen on an individual basis but are struck either at random or for symbolic
effect. The goal pursued in attacking them is not to eliminate the victims
themselves but to spread terror among the group to which they belong. By doing
so, terrorists generally seek to compel governments or public opinion to make
some concession towards them, if only to consider their position more
favourably.
However, the
international community has not yet been able to reach an agreement on such a
definition of terrorism. As my colleague Judge Rosalyn Higgins pointed out in
1997:
Terrorism
is a term without any legal significance. It is merely a convenient way of
alluding to activities, whether of States or of individuals, widely disapproved
of and in which either the methods used are unlawful, or the targets protected,
or both. O
Has this
failure resulted in serious consequences in practice? That is the issue I shall
now address by examining first the provisions of international criminal law
that deal with the perpetrators of terrorist acts and secondly those of public
international law governing the conduct of States involved in such acts.
The
various international instruments of a universal nature that have already been
drawn up under the auspices of the United Nations or specialized agencies have
one objective in common: to respond to the internationalization of terrorism by
the internationalization of repression.
In this
respect, however, it should be observed at the outset that, in the absence of
any agreed definition of terrorism, States have been unable to entrust
international criminal tribunals with the task of punishing this type of crime.
Even the new International Criminal Court, set up under the Rome Convention,
does not entertain jurisdiction over such offences. ll
Repression
is thus left to domestic police forces and courts, and its effectiveness will
largely depend on the quality of police and judicial cooperation between
States. In this respect, the various conventions of a universal nature that
deal with the perpetrators of specific offences, such as the hijacking of
aircraft or ships and hostage-taking, have considerably improved the situation
as far as those offences are concerned.
Each of
those conventions defines the offence or offences to which it applies and
obliges the signatory States to implement different measures of prevention.
They also impose an obligation to punish those offences by sentences usually
characterized as severe.
10 R
Higgins 'The General International Law of Terrorism', in R Higgins and M Flory
International Law and Terrorism (London Routledge 1997), at 28.
Il The
Final Act of the Rome Conference observes that, during the discussions, no
generally acceptable definition of crimes of terrorism could be agreed upon for
inclusion in the convention. It confines itself to recommending that the
question be reconsidered by the Review Conference to be held in 2010 (doc
A/CONF/183/10). The ICC nevertheless has jurisdiction in respect of terrorist
acts that constitute crimes against humanity or war crimes as defined in its
Statute.
As
regards the jurisdiction of courts, such treaties attempt to fill in the gaps
left by classical international law. Under the latter, domestic courts are
traditionally granted jurisdiction to punish first of all offences committed on
their territory and subsequently certain offences committed abroad, by or
against their nationals, or those which impugn their fundamental interests.
However, most domestic courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain offences
committed abroad by foreigners against foreigners. As a result, terrorists who
take refuge on the territory of a third State may escape prosecution in such
cases. Criminal law conventions which deal with various acts of violence,
including some of a terrorist nature, have attempted to fill the vacuum.
Those
conventions, inspired by the Hague Convention of 1970 on the Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft, thus multiply the bases of jurisdiction and impose an obligation
on each State party to establish its jurisdiction over the offences in question
in cases where 'the alleged offender is present on its territory' unless it
extradites that offender to another State. Such conventions thus provide for a
subsidiary universal jurisdiction—that of the arresting State—to ensure
application of the rule 'aut dedere, aut judicare'. According to that rule,
which Grotius advocated in his day, the arresting State has a choice between
prosecuting or extraditing. However, it is obliged to opt for one or the other
and cannot simply wash its hands of criminals found on its territory.
Apart
from the facilitation of extradition, it was difficult to impose more stringent
obligations on States at a worldwide level. It has only proved possible to go
further at a bilateral or regional level. For example, Libya agreed to the
trial in 2001 , by a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands and under
conditions agreed with the United Kingdom, of two of its nationals who stood
accused of organizing the Lockerbie bombing.
Similarly, the Member States of the European Union agreed in 2002 that
terrorism should be included among the offences giving rise to surrender pursuant
to a European arrest warrant rather than to the application of extradition
procedures .
Moreover,
it has recently become apparent that terrorist acts are increasingly
perpetrated by well-structured organizations with considerable financial
resources, rather than by isolated individuals or small groups. Seeking to
impede the operation of such organizations, a convention was adopted in New
York in 1999 with a view to hindering the financing of international terrorism.
The
events of 11 September 2001 did not lead to the adoption of any new measures
for the arrest, prosecution or extradition of terrorists. They did however
trigger a new determination to ensure the universal application of existing
measures.
By its
Resolutions 1368 and 1373, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of
the Charter, adopted a number of decisions of principle to be carried out by
States pursuant to Article 25 of the Charter. In particular, it imposed on all
States certain obligations specifically selected from those imposed by the 1999
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which at that
time was not yet in force. In so acting, the Council rendered certain purely
treaty rules binding on all Member States of the United Nations and thus
assumed the role of a true international legislator.
Moreover,
the Council went further with the creation of a committee charged with
combating terrorism, through which it seeks to monitor the implementation of
its resolutions by Member States. By a broadened interpretation of its mandate,
it is now assuming not only powers of action but also legislative powers in the
interest of international peace and security.
Furthermore,
the events of Il September 2001, and the anthrax scare that followed shortly
after, put the spotlight on the risks of biological and chemical terrorism.
Certain instruments already existed in these areas, but they remained
incomplete, and control mechanisms were still insufficient. Whilst the Chemical
Weapons Convention of 13 January 1993 had entrusted such controls to an
organization, the OPCW, that was not the case for the Biological Weapons
Convention of 10 April 1992. A Protocol was drawn up for that purpose, but in
December 2001 it met with opposition from the United States.
Notwithstanding
these deficiencies, the results in this field are far from insignificant. A
dozen or so conventions have been adopted for the prohibition and suppression
of various acts of terrorism and their ratification has been widespread. The
Security Council has extended their scope. Numerous obligations have thus
become incumbent upon States under international criminal law, which even
provides for certain control mechanisms. Whilst there is admittedly room for
improvement in this respect, over and above this, there is still an essential
question to be addressed: what should be done if States fail to meet their
obligations?
In answer
to this question, there are certain classic responses provided by international
law. When dealing with wrongful acts, States can either seek to rely upon the
law of State responsibility or resort to various forms of pressure, ranging
from countermeasures to the use of armed force.
As
regards international responsibility, a distinction can be made between two
different types of situation:
• that of the State on whose territory
terrorist attacks have been perpetrated;
• that of the State which is involved
in any other way in such attacks.
The legal
response is well-established in the first of these cases. On a number of
occasions, arbitral tribunals and the International Court of Justice have been
seised of disputes in which a State might have incurred international
responsibility as a result of injury caused to foreign nationals on its
territory by certain acts of violence that, in some cases, can be characterized
as terrorist. According to the case law which has thus developed, a careful
distinction should be drawn between those acts which are imputable to the
individual perpetrators and those acts or omissions for which public
authorities are responsible. State responsibility may be engaged, in
particular, if those authorities have failed to exercise the requisite degree
of vigilance or diligence.
Terrorist
acts perpetrated on the territory of a foreign State raise different issues.
Public authorities only have limited jurisdiction outside their own territory
and their responsibility will not normally be engaged unless they are involved
in some way or another in terrorist activity. That degree of involvement may
vary greatly: terrorist acts may be prepared on the territory of a State without
the knowledge of that State. In other cases a State may know that terrorists
are using its territory to prepare attacks, but will either be incapable of
controlling such activities or will fail to do so. A threshold is crossed when
terrorist organizations base themselves in a country with the forbearance or
even the support of the government. The highest level of involvement is reached
when the terrorist activity is actually initiated by government agents. It is
thus necessary to assess, on the facts of each particular case, whether a State
has demonstrated wrongful conduct and whether its international responsibility
is engaged.
Rather
than applying to an arbitrator or court to obtain the condemnation of the State
at fault, States that are victims of terrorism may exert various forms of
pressure on that State to attempt to make it change its conduct. Such pressure
may take the form of countermeasures not involving the use of armed force; in
extreme cases such use may be contemplated. In either case, the Security
Council may be required to take decisions under Chapter VIl of the Charter.
States may also be tempted to act on a unilateral basis.
Thus,
following the mid-air explosion of an American jet liner above the Scottish
town of Lockerbie in 1988, in 1992 the United States took unilateral
countermeasures against Libya, whilst the Security Council imposed an air
embargo on that country. Similarly,
following the attempt in Ethiopia to assassinate the Egyptian president and the
escape of the suspects to Sudan, the Security Council imposed sanctions on
Khartoum in 1996 The Council more
recently decided on various sanctions against Afghanistan, in 1999 and 2000,
demanding that 'the Taliban . cease the provision of sanctuary and training for
international terrorists' .
However,
the issues are much more sensitive when armed force is used against a State
accused of supporting terrorist activities. In principle, such use by a State
is contrary both to the rule of the non-use of force, pursuant to Article 2,
paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter, and to that of non-intervention as
recalled on several occasions by the International Court of Justice. Thus, in the absence of a decision by the
Security Council, States which have used force unilaterally have generally
sought to justify their conduct either on the ground of humanitarian
intervention or by arguing that they have been the victim of an armed attack
within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter.
In this
respect, the events of 11 September 2001 raise issues of the greatest interest
concerning both the powers of the Security Council and the exercise of
self-defence.
The very
next day after the attacks, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1368, in
which it regarded those acts, using the very words of Chapter VIl of the
Charter, as 'a threat to international peace and security'. The Council could
thus have been expected, in exercising the responsibilities vested in it in
such matters, to take certain decisions with a view to addressing that threat.
However, this was not the case. After condemning the attacks, and stating that
it was ready to act, the Council did not in fact take any concrete measures
directly relating to those attacks.
The
military action by American armed forces and their allies in Afghanistan was
not initiated in the context of the United Nations but as an exercise of the
right of self-defence—a right in fact expressly recognized by the Security
Council in the preamble to its Resolution 1368. In his letter of 7 October 2001
to the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of the
United States thus indicated:
In
response to [the] attacks of I l September, and in accordance with the inherent
right of individual and collective self defence, United States Forces have
initiated actions designed to prevent and deter further attacks on the United
States. These actions include measures against Al-Qaïda terrorist training
camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
The
Security Council did not react to this communication. It was not until the
Taliban régime was overthrown that the Council further addressed the situation
in Afghanistan, approving the Bonn Agreement between Afghan groups and
authorizing the deployment of an international security force with the
participation of Member States.
This
situation has posed many questions and it has quite rightly been emphasized
that, if a military response to the attacks was necessary, the unanimous
support given to the United States offered a historic opportunity for Chapter
VIl of the Charter. But whilst the United Nations was prepared to authorize
military action by the United States and its allies in Afghanistan, the United
States was not looking for such authorization. It was seeking to act freely by
invoking its inherent right of self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the
Charter.
There has
been considerable debate in the literature about whether such a right really
existed in this situation Could the
attacks on the World Trade Centre be regarded as an 'armed attack'? Could the
right of self-defence as recognized by Article 51 of the Charter be exercised
on foreign territory not only when the attacker is a State, but even when it is
a non-State terrorist organization like Al-Qaida? If not, was the Taliban
régime's support for Al-Qaida such that the Afghan State could be regarded as
having perpetrated an armed attack against the United States?
These
questions have given rise to heated debate and I will simply note that,
according to the majority of authors, acts of terrorism reaching the extent and
gravity of the events on 11 September 2001 could be described as acts of armed
attack. However, for those acts to be considered as acts of armed attack within
the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter, such acts, in the view of those same
authors, have to be attributed not only to private individuals liable to
criminal prosecution, but further to a State which exercises effective control
over those individuals. In the circumstances at issue, certain doubts were
expressed as to whether the Taliban really exercised such control over
Al-Qaida. In other words, whilst it was not in dispute that Kabul's support for
AlQaida engaged the responsibility of Afghanistan, there was some controversy
about whether that country in fact perpetrated an armed attack against the
United States within the meaning of the Charter.
By
contrast, it was pointed out by others that the argument whereby the 1 1
September attacks justified a right to use force on the basis of self-defence
had hardly met with any opposition from States and that it was even explicitly
endorsed by both the North Atlantic Council and the European Council It was further suggested by some that the 1
1 September attacks and the ensuing reactions had led to the emergence of a new
law on the use of force, authorizing States to use force on foreign territory
in the face of grave acts of violence perpetrated by private individuals or
groups, regardless of any link between them and a particular State.
Certain
doubts have been expressed, however, as to the validity of this argument. It
has thus been emphasized that it would be dubious to derive an instantaneous
custom from one isolated precedent. It has further been observed that this
evolution would amount to such a radical change in international law that it
would require a clearer practice and a more constant opinio juris.
The
debate is not over, but such questions pertaining to the jus ad bellum have now
to a certain extent lost their immediacy. However, that is not the case for
questions of jus in bello, especially those concerning the application of the
Third Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War and of the Fourth Convention on the
Protection of Civilians in respect of the persons who were captured by the
allied armed forces during military operations in Afghanistan.
Many of
those individuals were transferred to the US base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba
where most of them are still held. The United States considered that the Geneva
Conventions applied to the Taliban detainees captured in Afghanistan, but not
to the Al-Qaida combatants. It was further decided by the United States that
the Taliban 'did not meet the criteria applicable to lawful combatants' and
that, accordingly, they did not enjoy the status of prisoner of war within the
meaning of the Third Geneva Convention. That stance aroused lively debate and
the ICRC pointed out that in case of doubt in this respect the Third Convention
provided in Article 5 that persons 'having committed a belligerent act and
having fallen into the hands of the enemy shall enjoy the protection of the . .
. Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent
tribunal'. For its part, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights rendered
a decision on 12 March 2002 in which it requested the United States 'to take
the urgent measures necessary to have the legal status of the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay determined by a competent tribunal' Various actions have been brought before
domestic courts, both in the United States and in Europe, and the submission of
the matter to the International Court of Justice has been envisaged. I am sure
you will thus understand if I refrain from dwelling more on the subject at this
stage.
Chapter V
Conclusion and Recommendations
5.1 Summary
The terrorist groups normally do not get any
support from the society. For preparation of the Bomb/IED they try to exploit
the technology and collect the raw materials from the readily available
chemical substances. The trend of bombs and the attacks in the developed
countries and least developed countries may vary in technology, dimension
and in different places but all such
attacks are obviously against the humanity. The result is surely loss of life,
serious injury, damage of property and an unsafe environment.
IED or Bomb incidents throughout the world
have become a great concern to the peace lovers. It is for sure that the attackers resort to
such heinous act to achieve their unjust demands. At times they launch suicidal
attack being highly motivated by their
group. In this new millennium the frequency and dimension of the bomb/IED
attacks has attained its peak. Thereby the environment of peace and tranquility
is under tremendous risk.
The synchronized bomb blast at 63 District
Headquarters of Bangladesh is a rare incident. Possibly the IED's were
intentionally made less harmful because even with the use of good amount of
Home Made Explosives it could have been very dangerous. May be to avoid check
and detection by Security Forces the size of the IED's was not increased. It's
a clear alarm for everyone that the terrorist can attack at any place at their
desired time with their desired devastation as the expertise they have shown in
preparation of these IED's.
In 2006
after massive effort by the security forces specially RAB, bomb incident was
controlled to a satisfactory level and the people are a bit relaxed. Our
beloved Bangladesh was in low profile bomb threat, but last few bomb incidents
shook our peace and tranquil environment. But our peace loving people are
always against this type of destructive activities. It is not too late for the
Bangladesh to stand against these terrorist threats. The priority and urgency
to fight against terror has gained the apex of general conscientious. So, we
may say that present time is the best time to think, plan and execute the
perfect countermeasures to stop and eliminate all types of terrorist activities
from our country. Even if we achieve to control such activities; it will help
us in the long run to bring normalcy in our civic life.
5.2 Discussion
The
extent and nature of terrorist threats have been changing around the world.
Bangladesh is not immune from this challenge. The preceding discussion has
analysed the activities of different threat groups, indicators of potential
threat, and the government responses in order to understand the level of
terrorism threat for Bangladesh. Despite all drives against the terrorist
groups, many threat indicators are perceptible in the country. Several groups
are operating in different scope, capacity and nature. A number of threat
indicators have been identified in Bangladesh. Some of these are (i) operations
of known and active groups or networks, (ii) stated aims and objectives, (iii)
intent of threat groups, (iv) evidence of terrorist activities, and (v) the
increase in strategic and operational capabilities of terrorist groups to stage
further attacks. On the other hand, the entire government responses to counter
terrorism demonstrate the use of ‘hard power’[24]
without addressing the root causes and new trends of terrorism. The ‘soft
power’[25] mechanisms
are not being sufficiently addressed in Bangladesh.
Taking
into account all indicators together, the threat level is increasing in Bangladesh.
What should be the way out to face such motivated challenges? Owing to the
multi-dimensionality of the problem, it is critically important to explore a
viable and effective strategy incorporating short-term, medium-term and
long-term goals. The short-term goals include finding out the extremist groups’
hideouts, exposing groups’ motives, targets, command, control and
support infrastructure, responding
effectively, efficiently and rapidly by security forces in arresting and
bringing them under law, profiling extremist individuals, groups and cases by
gathering critical information. These short-term initiatives may contribute to
weakening of the threat groups and motivating citizens in combating terrorism.
Any failure in this regard may result in further escalation of violence in the
society.
The
medium-term goals include running an effective oversight and security system,
increasing coordination among law enforcement agencies, service sectors, and
social forces in order to create an allinclusive security environment in the
country. It is also necessary to ratify and implement regional and
international documents relating to the issues of extremism, violence and
terrorism. Ultimately, terrorism cannot be prevented by addressing short and
medium term goals. There must be long-term and comprehensive goals in order to
address the root causes of the problem. The long-term measures should be
preventive in nature. It is necessary to establish a general counter terrorism
discourse by promoting unity and consensus in the political society of
Bangladesh. This unity promoting function is particularly crucial for
Bangladesh where ideological zeal, even in a rhetorical form, can provide an
outlet for daily social and economic frustrations. Corruption should be addressed
on priority basis so that it cannot provide opportunity to further rise in
terrorism.
Currently,
in the absence of political activities in Bangladesh, the government must look
into whether the corrupt money is spent for financing terrorist activities. Some
of the long-term goals are (i) modernization of all streams of education; with
a view to incorporating substantive secular components. (ii) Reducing economic
disparity through social cohesion in order to address the grievances of the
deprived citizens. (iii) Promoting microgovernance activities by strengthening
community responses, localizing policies, utilizing local knowledge and
capacity. And (iv) identification of ‘strategic communication’ tools to
interact with the extremist
individuals
and groups to get their message, perceptions and ideas, etc. It can help to
design strategic counter terrorism tools in Bangladesh. To defend against these
threats and to ensure national security, Bangladesh urgently needs to cope with
the shifting trends of terrorism threats, mainly focusing on micro actors and
issues.
My first
impression is that, over the past 40 years, international criminal law has made
significant progress in the combat against international terrorism. Whilst that
combat is still mainly a matter for the police and domestic courts, numerous
conventions have been adopted and ratified on a universal level with a view to
ensuring the prosecution or extradition of the perpetrators of various crimes.
Judicial and police cooperation has developed on both a bilateral and a
regional level. Most of the normative work has been accomplished.
The
application of those norms is nevertheless dependent on the will of States. In
this respect, it cannot be denied that certain difficulties may arise, either
because certain States are unable to maintain their authority on their own
territory, or because of wrongful conduct by the States themselves.
In view
of the development and globalization of terrorist networks, States which are
potential targets of murderous attacks can no longer remain indifferent to such
dangers. In this respect, the events of 11 September 2001 have opened their
eyes.
Those
events have propelled States to the forefront of the international arena. Over
the previous few decades, both scholarly writings and the media had constantly
been promoting international civil society, in opposition to States seen as
heartless 'monsters'. The Il September attacks have shown that such monsters
may emerge from civil society itself and that the terrorist groups themselves
have now become actors of the international community in their own right.
In the
current circumstances, States have appeared to represent the best defence
against terror, as they alone are entitled to deploy violence legitimately.
They must nevertheless, of course, act in compliance with the law , and in
particular with international law, of which various areas are relevant: the law
on the use of force, criminal law, humanitarian law and human rights.
International law is not as ill-prepared on this question as we have been led
to believe and States cannot allow themselves to disregard it. That is the
underlying condition for the legitimacy of their action.
5.3 Recommendations
To prevent media from furthering terrorist goals as a byproduct of
vigorous and free reporting, Raphael F. Perl of U.S. Congressional Research
Service proposed:
(1)
Financing
joint media/government training exercises;
(2)
Establishing
a government terrorism information response center;
(3)
Promoting
the use of media pools;
(4)
Promoting
voluntary press guidelines; and
(5)
Monitoring
terrorism against media.
This is
not successful both in US and Philippines.
Governments should guarantee media safety:
·
This is
to preserve press freedom.
·
This
invites less media skepticism and a little more respect.
·
A
government who cannot guarantee safety of media will invite media practitioners
to seek those guarantees from their own news sources.
Regime terrorism
·
Terrorism
from government against Filipinos.
·
There is
more media skepticism of government in here.
·
Claims of
human rights violations as a consequence of this terrorism are either surely
exaggerated, or the invention of “marginalized” insurgent groups.
·
Reporting
incidents under this has been either minimal, shallow, or blatantly biased in
favor of government.
To accurately and faithfully report these incidents:
·
Enhancement
of media practitioners’ outrage, and sense of history and justice as
indivisible components of the ethical and professional imperatives of the media
professions.
·
Requires
a reassessment of where media’s allegiance resides: whether in governments or
in the people they claim to represent.
What Filipino media practitioners lack:
·
Information,
which is ironic for professionals whose practice, depends upon it.
Government
and media should stay clear of each other – their relationship in the reporting
of terrorist incidents as well as of other forms of conflict should remain
firmly adversarial and mutually skeptical.
Media has
the responsibility to educate themselves in a world of increasing complexity in
which things are often not what they seem, but in which information has never
been as crucial to the inhabitants of this planet, including that part of it
known as the Philippines.
References
References
Books
Alberto
R. Gonzales, Regina B. Schofield, Domingo S. Herraiz, “Assessing and Managing
the Terrorism Threat”, the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, September 2005, p. 6.
Todd
Sandler, Daniet Arce and Walter Enders, “Transnational
Terrorism”, Quoted in the Economist,
8 March 2008, p.69.
Steve
Coll and Susan B.Glasser, “Terrorists
Turn to the Web as Base of Operations”, The
Washington Post, 7 August 2005, p.1;
Gabriel
Weimann, “Terror on the Internet: The New
Arena, the New Challenges”, The United States Institute for Peace,
Washington, D.C.,
Raphael Perl, Trends in Terrorism: 2006, CRS Report
for Congress, 21 July 2006.
Rohan
Gunaratna, “The Post-Madrid Face of Al
Qaeda”, the Washington Quarterly, vol.
27, no. 3, Summer 2004, pp. 91-100.
Journals
The law enforcement
agencies captured ten members of different Islamist groups while distributing
Jihadi materials. The Daily Star, 26
January 2008.
Sohrab Hossain, “Militants Preaching
Jihad in Patuakhali”, The Daily Star,
19 January 2008.
A
SWOT (Strength, Weakness, Opportunity and Threat) mode of analysis is used to
understand the compelling indicators to assist strategic planning process. It
is a listing of strengths and opportunities as well as the weaknesses and
threats of the current process in order to develop future strategies.
Chrisman Willard George, “Abstract”, International Terrorism Threat Analysis,
Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey Calif
Lt
General ATM Zahirul Alam, “National Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and
Options”, the keynote paper for the
Independence Day Commemorative Seminar on National
Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and Options, organized by the Bangladesh
Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 30 March 2008.
Abdur
Rob Khan, “National Security of
Bangladesh: A Non- Traditional Security Approach”, paper
presented at the Independence Day Commemorative Seminar on National Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and Options, organized
by the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 30 March
2008.
Websites
http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&id
entifier=ADA039928, accessed on 12 March 2017.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/systems/threat-assessment.htm,
accessed 12 March 2017.
http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=25971/,
accessed on 19 February 2017.
[1]
Todd Sandler, Daniet Arce and Walter Enders, “Transnational Terrorism”, Quoted
in the Economist, 8 March 2008, p.69.
2 Steve Coll and Susan B.Glasser, “Terrorists Turn to the Web as
Base of Operations”, The Washington Post,
7 August 2005, p.1; Gabriel Weimann,
“Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges”, The United States
Institute for Peace, Washington, D.C.,
[2]
Raphael Perl, Trends in Terrorism: 2006,
CRS Report for Congress, 21 July 2006.
[3]
The law enforcement agencies captured ten members of different Islamist groups
while distributing Jihadi materials. The
Daily Star, 26 January 2008.
[4]
See, for details, Sohrab Hossain, “Militants Preaching Jihad in Patuakhali”, The Daily Star, 19 January 2008.
[5] A
SWOT (Strength, Weakness, Opportunity and Threat) mode of analysis is used to
understand the compelling indicators to assist strategic planning process. It
is a listing of strengths and opportunities as well as the weaknesses and
threats of the current process in order to develop future strategies.
[6]
Chrisman Willard George, “Abstract”, International Terrorism Threat
Analysis, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey Calif,
available at: http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&id
entifier=ADA039928, accessed on 12 March 2017.
[7]
Alberto
R. Gonzales, Regina B. Schofield, Domingo S. Herraiz, “Assessing and Managing the Terrorism Threat”, the U.S. Department
of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, September 2005, p. 6.
[8]
Prepared by author, based on Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly, The Dynamic Terrorism Threat, RAND, 2004, p. xiv.
[9]
Rohan Gunaratna, “The Post-Madrid Face of Al Qaeda”, the Washington Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 3, Summer 2004, pp. 91-100.
[10] http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/systems/threat-assessment.htm,
accessed 12 March 2008.
[11]
Lt General ATM Zahirul Alam, “National Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and
Options”, the keynote paper for the
Independence Day
Commemorative Seminar on National
Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and Options, organized by the Bangladesh
Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 30 March 2008.
[12]
See, for details, The Daily Star, Internet
Edition 4 March, 12 & 14 June, 2008.
Available at:
(i) http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=25971/,
accessed on 19 June 2017.
[13] Ibid.
[14]
Abdur Rob Khan, “National Security of Bangladesh: A Non-
Traditional Security Approach”, paper presented at the Independence Day
Commemorative Seminar on National
Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and Options, organized by the Bangladesh
Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 30 March 2008.
[15] The Daily Star, 26 January 2008.
[16] The Daily Shamokal, 12 October 2007 and the Daily Star, 11 October 2007.
[17] The Daily Star, 19 February 2006.
[18]
The Aon Corporation, 2007. Available at: www.aon.com, accessed on 28 March 2008.
[19]
Abul Kalam, “The Challenges of Terrorism: Bangladesh Responses”, in Moni, SD.
(ed) Responding to Terrorism in South
Asia, Monohar, New Delhi, 2006.
[20]
The Daily Star, 18 June 2008.
[21] The Daily Prothom Alo, 13 June 2008.
Available at:
http://www.prothom-alo.com/archive/news_details_mcat.php?dt=200806, accessed on 20 June 2008.
[22] The New Nation, 3 March 2008.
[23]
M. Sakhawat Hussain, “Capacity Building of Law Enforcement and Intelligence
Agencies” in Farooq Sobhan, ed., Counter
Terrorism in
Bangladesh, University Press Limited,
Dhaka, 2008, p. 61. 24 Ibid, p. 70.
[24]
Action by military forces, intelligence agencies, police and law enforcement
agencies, etc.
[25]
Governance measures, community responses, border control, counterterrorist
financing initiatives, etc.
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